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NO PLACE FOR EQUAL SPACE IN THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press1 has long
been viewed as a right imbued with a public trust.2 But while the
right to "equal time"3 over the airwaves has gained judicial recogni-
tion,4 an analogous right to "equal space" in the printed media has
not developed. It has never been held that the first amendment com-
mands such a right,' and only two states, Florida and Mississippi, 7
1. The first amendment protects electronic and printed media alike, but the differ-
ences between the media often dictate that different considerations apply. See notes
64-66 infra and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (where it is noted that the
guarantee of a free press is "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit
of all of us"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970) requires li-
censees to provide equal time for all qualified candidates for public office. The Fed-
eral Communications Commission enforces the fairness doctrine (see note 23 infra)
and associated regulations to provide a similar right to equal time over the airwaves
in other contexts. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1972). The personal attack regulation re-
quires a licensee, in the event an attack is made on an identified person or group,
(1) to notify that person or group of the date, time, and identification of the broad-
cast, (2) to provide a script or tape or (if none is available) an accurate summary of
the attack, and (3) to offer a reasonable opportunity to respond. These requirements
must be satisfied within one week of the attack.
The regulation on political editorializing provides that, if a licensee endorses or op-
poses a candidate in an editorial, the licensee must give other qualified candidates or
the opposed candidate the same type of notice and opportunity to respond described
above within twenty-four hours of the editorial or, if the editorial is broadcast within
seventy-two hours of an election, sufficiently in advance of broadcast to permit timely
reply.
4. See notes 21-26 infra and accompanying text.
5. But cf. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HA^v.
L. REv. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barron] which forcefully presents the case
for a constitutional right of access to the printed media. The author of this article,
Jerome A. Barron, was one of the attorneys for the appellant in Tomillo v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), consideration of juris. postponed to
the hearing of the case on the merits, 42 U.S.L.W. 3405 (1973) (No. 797),
discussed infra. Barron's position has drawn considerable comment. See, e.g.,
Bagdikian, Right of Access: A Modest Proposal, 8 COLUM. JOURNALISM RuV.
10 (1969); Daniel, Right of Access to Mass Media--Government Obligation to En-
force First Amendment?, 48 TExAs L. Rav. 783 (1970); Comment, Constitutional
Law: The Right of Access to the Press, 50 NEB. L. REv. 120 (1970). For additional
commentary by Barron on this subject, see Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the
Media?, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 766 (1970); Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right
of Access to the-Media?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 487 (1969); Barron, In Defense of
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have enacted statutes granting private individuals access to the press."
The constitutionality of such legislation had not been litigated9 until
recently when the highest courts of Florida and Massachusetts consid-
ered the issue and reached opposite conclusions.' 0
I
A Florida statute provides that a newspaper which attacks a candi-
date for public office and fails to provide free of charge a like amount
"Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37
U. CoLo. L. REv. 31 (1964).
6. FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1973) provides:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate
for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with mal-
feasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives
to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such
candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as
conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such
reply provided such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to.
Any person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree ....
7. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-3-35 (1972) provides:
If during any primary or other election campaign in Mississippi, any newspa-
per either domiciled in the state, or outside of the state circulating inside the
State of Mississippi, shall print any editorial or news story reflecting upon the
honesty or integrity or moral character of any candidate in such campaign or on
the honesty and integrity or moral character of any candidate who was elected or
defeated in such campaign, such newspaper shall, on the written or telegraphic re-
quest of such candidate or his agents, print in such newspaper not later than the sec-
ond issue of such newspaper following the receipt of such request, a statement by
the candidate or his duly accredited representative giving the candidate's reply.
Such statement shall be printed in the exact language which the candidate or his
representative presents and shall be printed as near as is practical on the same
page, in the same position, and in the same size type and headlines as the original
editorial or news story reflecting on the candidate had been printed.
This section shall be construed to include those news stories wherein the news-
paper quotes from a candidate or individual statements attacking the honesty or
integrity or moral character of a candidate or ex-candidate.
If such newspaper fails or refuses to publish such answer when requested, the
owner of such newspaper shall be liable to a suit for damages by the candidate
claiming to be injured by such publication. In event of a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, the measure of damages shall be the injury suffered or a penalty of five
hundred dollars, whichever is the larger amount. In all cases, the truth of the
charge may be offered as defense to the suit. But nothing herein contained shall
be construed to abolish any existing legal rights of action in such cases.
8. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(2) (1966) provides that publication of a reply may
serve as an alternative to the publication of a retraction for the purposes of correcting
an allegedly libelous statement under circumstances where the truth of the statement
was not reasonably ascertainable.
9. In Manasco v. Walley, 63 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1953) it was found that the particular
editorial complained of did not reflect "upon the honesty, integrity or moral character
of the candidate" and, therefore, "did not come within the provisions of the statute."
Id. at 96. The constitutional issue was apparently not raised.
10. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), consideration
of juris. postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits, 42 U.S.L.W. 3405 (1973)
(No. 797); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973),
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of space for the candidate's reply shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
The Miami Herald printed two editorials attacking a candidate for the
state legislature but refused to publish his proffered replies.' 2 The
candidate brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
punitive damages under the access statute.' 8 The trial court struck
down the statute as a restraint on freedom of speech and of the press
and as impermissibly vague and indefinite. 14 In Tornillo v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co.,' 5 the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding
that
[t]he statute assures, and does not abridge, the right of expression
which the First Amendment guarantees. The statute supports the free-
dom of the press in its true meaning-that is, the right of the reader
to the whole story, rather than half of it--and without which the reader
would be "blacked out" as to the other side of the controversy.'"
Since the 1913 Florida statute was enacted as part of a broad legis-
lative scheme designed to maintain conditions conducive to free and
fair elections,' 7 the Florida majority found that it served a vital and
legitimate state interest by providing an opportunity for the assailed
candidate to be heard' s and by assuring that the public would hear
both sides of a controversy.' 9 Far from being an incursion on first
amendment rights, the statute encouraged "the wide open and robust
dissemination of ideas and counterthought which the concept of free
press both fosters and protects.
'20
11. 287 So. 2d at 79.
12. Id. Pat L. Tornillo is the leader of the Dade County Classroom Teachers' As-
sociation, an activist organization of public school teachers. In 1972 he became a can-
didate for the Democratic nomination for a seat in the Florida State House of Repre-
sentatives. On September 20, 1972 the Miami Herald published an editorial calling
Tornillo "a czar" who had taken part in "illegal act(s) against the public interest."
On September 29, 1972 the newspaper ran a second editorial assailing Tornillo's can-
didacy:
For years now he (Tornillo) has been kicking the public shin to call attention to
his shakedown statesmanship.... Give him public office says Pat and he will
no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our translation reads that as more gold and
more rule.
To each of these editorials Tornillo demanded space to reply under the access statute.
Brief for Appellant at xviii-xx.
13. 287 So. 2d at 79.
14. Id. at 80. The State Attorney General had refused to defend the statute because
of his doubts as to its constitutionality. Brief for Appellee at 2.
15. 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), consideration of juris. postponed to the hearing of
the case on the merits, 42 U.S.L.W. 3405 (1973) (No. 797). The court divided 6-1.
16. Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
17. Id. at 81.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 86.
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The Florida court relied heavily on Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC,2 the case which upheld22 the fairness doctrine23 and associ-
ated regulations of the Federal Communications Commission2 4 provid-
ing for public access to the broadcast media. Since the limited number
of available frequencies 25 necessarily restricted the number of persons
permitted to operate radio or television stations, the Red Lion Court
was prepared to sanction governmentally dictated alternative routes of
access to the electronic media. 26  The Tornillo court saw a clear anal-
ogy in the trend toward concentration in the newspaper industry. 27 The
court reasoned that this tendency toward monopolization might deprive
the public of its right to be exposed to all sides of a controversy unless
the government provided access to the press for conflicting view-
points.2 s Since the statute questioned in Tornillo was substantially
equivalent to the FCC's "personal attack" regulation approved in Red
Lion,20 the court concluded that the statute was "consistent with
the First Amendment as applied to [the] State through the Fourteenth
Amendment.,,30 -
21. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
22. Id. at 400-01.
23. The fairness doctrine is described in Red Lion as
an obligation whose content has been defined in a long series of FCC rulings in
particular cases, and which is distinct from the statutory requirement of § 315
of the Communications Act [47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970)] that equal time be allotted
all qualified candidates for public office.
Id. at 369-70. The doctrine deals with the fair treatment by licensees of controversial
issues of public importance. A Commission analysis of the fairness doctrine and a
digest of FCC rulings on the subject appear at 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964).
24. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1972). See note 3 supra.
25. 395 U.S. at 376-77.
26. Id. at 400-01. See text accompanying notes 54-60 infra.
27. 287 So. 2d at 82-83.
The number of daily newspapers in the United States declined from 2202 in
1909-10 to 1760 in 1953-54. The number of cities with competing daily newspapers
declined from 689 to 87. The number of cities with non-competing dailies in-
creased from 518 to 1361. Eighteen states are now without any locally competing
daily newspapers.
Barron, supra note 5, at 1644 n.10, citing J.R. WiGGiNs, FtEEDOM OR SECRECY 177
(rev. ed. 1964).
28. 287 So. 2d at 82-83.
29. Compare note 3 supra with note 6 supra.
30. 287 So. 2d at 84. The Tornillo court also took solace from dictum in a footnote
contained in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971), apparently approving right of reply statutes as an alternative to
libel suits in the area of defamation. Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Justice
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, observed:
Some States have adopted retraction statutes or right-of-reply statutes. ...
One writer, in arguing that the First Amendment itself should be read to guar-
antee a right of access to the media not limited to a right to respond to defama-
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A proposed Massachusetts access statute,31 not differing in principle
from the law upheld in Tornillo, did not fare nearly so well in Opinion
of the Justices to the Senate.2 The Massachusetts State Senate asked
that state's supreme judicial court for an advisory opinion" on the con-
tory falsehoods, has suggested several ways the law might encourage public discus-
sion. . . . It is important to recognize that the private individual often desires
press exposure either for himself, his ideas, or his causes. Constitutional adjudi-
cation must take into account the individual's interest in access to the press as well
as the individual's interest in preserving his reputation, even though libel actions by
their nature encourage a narrow view of the individual's interest since they focus
only on situations where the individual has been harmed by undesired press atten-
tion. A constitutional rule that deters the press from covering the ideas or activi-
ties of the private individual thus conceives the individual's interest too narrowly.
Id. at 47 n.15 (citations omitted). It is difficult to assess the significance of Justice
Brennan's statement, particularly since it is clearly dictum. Since Rosenbloom dealt
with the electronic media, any statements relating to the printed media, while certainly
relevant, were not essential to the holding. Moreover, any vitality this Rosenbloom
dictum may have had is greatly diminished by the position taken by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Blackmun in the Pittsburgh Press case. See text accompanying notes
41-45 infra. That case upheld a city ordinance which restricted the newspaper's right
to segregate "help-wanted" ads into sex-designated columns. The Chief Justice dis-
sented on the grounds that the ordinance encroached upon the newspaper's "protected
journalistic discretion." 413 U.S. at 394. Justice Blackmun concurred in an opinion
written by Justice Stewart which declared that a governmental agency cannot tell a
newspaper what it can and cannot print. Id. at 400.
31. Section 39A. If the owner, editor, publisher or agent of a newspaper or
other periodical of general circulation publishes any paid political advertisement
designed or tending to aid, injure or defeat any candidate for public or political
office or any position with respect to a question to be submitted to the voters, he
shall not refuse to publish any paid political advertisement tending to aid, injure
or defeat any other candidate for the same public or political office or any other
position with respect to the same question to be submitted to the voters in the pri-
mary or election unless such publication would violate section forty-two or any
other provision of this chapter.
Whoever refuses to comply with this section may be ordered to comply there-
with in a suit in equity commenced by any aggrieved candidate or other person or
persons and shall forfeit to him or them not less than one hundred dollars. The
court may award such additional damages as it may deem proper, together with
costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Section 39B. The owner, editor, publisher or agent of a newspaper or other
periodical of general circulation shall not charge for the publication of any paid
political advertisement an amount greater than the local display rate charged for a
paid nonpolitical advertisement offered under similar circumstances and of compar-
able size, complexity, and location in the same edition or issue of such newspaper
or periodical.
A candidate or other person or persons aggrieved by a violation of this section
may recover treble the differential between the amount charged and the amount
that should have been charged, plus court costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee.
298 N.E.2d at 830-31.
32. 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973).
33. The Massachusetts court had previously disapproved a statute on the same sub-
ject on grounds of vagueness. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 284 N.E.2d 919
(Mass. 1972). Although the new draft remedied those problems, it still could not pass
muster under the first amendment.
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stitutionality of proposed legislation providing (1) that a newspaper
which published paid political advertisements for any candidate for of-
fice could not refuse paid political advertising from his opponents"4 and
(2) that charges for political advertising space could not exceed charges
for nonpolitical advertising space.3 5 The court disapproved the first
provision as an impermissible "interference with or prior restraint on
the freedom of the press." '86 The Massachusetts court reviewed and
relied upon first amendment cases limiting government to those regula-
tions which serve a compelling governmental interest and which restrict
first amendment freedoms no more than necessary.8 7  The proposed
statute failed on both grounds. First, there were no legislative findings
of any substantial or overriding governmental interest to be served by
the statute.8 8  Second, the court held that "compulsion to publish all
responsive political advertisements . . . goes beyond what is essential
to the furtherance of any interest of a State in its citizens having a right
of access to newspapers . ... ",9
The basis for such advisory opinions is MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 11 (West
Supp. 1973): "Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or the council,
shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court,
upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."
34. See note 31 supra.
35. See note 31 supra.
36. 298 N.E.2d at 831. Section 39B was approved as dealing "exclusively with a
commercial aspect of the operation of a newspaper or other periodical." Id. at 835.
See note 45 infra.
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) had rejected the con-
tention that the first amendment required a broadcaster to accept paid political ad-
vertising in response to advertisements he had already run. That case was not disposi-
tive of the issue before the Massachusetts court, however, since it did not decide
whether such a requirement could be created by legislative or administrative action.
Id. at 131. But the Supreme Court intimated strongly that such action would be valid.
"Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission--or the broadcasters-
may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable."
Id.
37. 298 N.E.2d at 834. The court cited United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968) (upholding narrowly drawn prohibition against draft card burning). For
similar holdings, see, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1965) (striking
down state motion picture censorship statute lacking sufficient safeguards of first
amendment rights); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 302-10 (1964) (restricting ap-
plication of corporate registration and business qualification laws so as not to infringe
freedom of association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431-38 (1963) (restricting
application of law prohibiting solicitation of business by or for attorneys so as not to
stifle first amendment freedoms).
38. 298 N.E.2d at 834.
39. Id. at 835. The Florida statute required the printing of a reply of the same
size as the original attack. See note 6 supra. The Massachusetts bill would have re-
quired acceptance of all proffered paid political responses. See note 31 supra. While
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The court feared that such compulsion might cause newspapers to re-
fuse to accept political advertisements rather than be saddled with the
burden of publishing responses and concluded that this chilling effect
would not aid the fair dissemination of political advertising. 40
Finally, the court looked to Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com-
mission on Human Relations41 where a divided United States Supreme
Court had ruled that it was not unconstitutional to regulate the column
in which help-wanted ads appeared in order to eliminate sex discrimina-
tion in employment.42  The four dissenters, 43 however, felt that even
the regulation of so limited a matter was an impermissible intrusion
on journalistic discretion.44 The Massachusetts court reasoned that if
regulation of the content of commercial advertising is a close and dis-
puted question, an attempt to mandate the content of political (as op-
posed to commercial) advertising must fail a fortiori.4"
I.
Although bases could be formulated for distinguishing these two
this is a clear distinction between the two cases, it is likewise clear that the Massachu-
setts opinion did not rest on this point, for the court continued, "Indeed, no set of
circumstances may exist which would support a legislative mandate that a newspaper
or other publication of general circulation must publish a political advertisement." Id.
(emphasis added).
40. Id. at 834-35.
41. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
42. Id. at 391.
43. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas and Stewart filed dissenting opinions.
Justices Douglas and Blackmun also concurred in Justice Stewart's dissent.
44. 413 U.S. at 394.
45. The court recognized that commercial advertising is generally subject to govern-
mental regulation. Id., citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (restriction
on distribution of commercial handbills). The Massachusetts court noted that the press
"has no special immunity from civil and criminal laws which relate to its business as-
pects." 298 N.E.2d at 832. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
265-92 (1964) (malicious libel); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6-8
(1945) (antitrust laws); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1943) (taxa-
tion); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 125 (1937) (labor laws). However,
unless there is a compelling governmental interest, government regulations may not be
used to tell the press what it may or may not publish. 298 N.E.2d at 832. See, e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
But the court was unwilling to depart from the cases which hold that newspapers
are free to accept or reject advertising as they see fit. 298 N.E.2d at 834. See, e.g.,
Associates & Aldrich Co., Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 1334 134-36 (9th Cir.
1971) (newspaper could censor, modify or refuse to publish movie advertisements);
Chicago Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d
470, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1970) (newspaper could refuse to run paid editorial advertise-
ments submitted by labor union).
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cases,4 the opinions proceed from radically different concepts of the
first amendment. The Florida case illustrates the view that the first
amendment formula is really a shorthand description of certain values
sought to be promoted, e.g., "the right of the public to know all sides
of a controversy and from such information to be able to make an en-
lightened choice.
'47
Under this view (hereinafter called the "first amendment values"
theory) the concepts of "free speech" and "free press" are simply differ-
ent statements of the same proposition, i.e., that free and full discussion
of public affairs is the essence of self-government.48  Thus, the Florida
opinion moves easily from the freedom of speech (expression) of news-
paper owners to the freedom of the press to the freedom of expression
of individual citizens with little concern for any distinction between
them.49 There is little attempt to treat these various interests differ-
ently since they are all subsumed under the same first amendment val-
ues. Since the court determined that these values were promoted by
the Florida access statute, it reasoned that the statute could not violate
any of the specific commands of the first amendment.50
The Massachusetts opinion is based on a second, fundamentally dif-
ferent concept of the first amendment. Recognizing that the first
amendment represents certain values (such as the free flow of informa-
tion and the right of the public to know), this view finds it disposi-
tive that the first amendment could have, but did not, protect these
values expressly. Instead, the mandate to Congress is couched in "thou
shalt not" terms in order to protect the specific first amendment free-
doms from governmental abridgment. Under this view (hereinafter
called the "value judgment" theory), the first amendment stands for
the value judgment that a free and unfettered press is the best way
to promote first amendment values. This value judgment operates
46. See note 39 supra. In addition, the Massachusetts court found no evidence of
a legislative determination of a substantial state interest served by the statute, while
the Florida court had no difficulty in finding a clear interest in maintenance of the
electoral process expressed in the Florida statutory scheme.
47. 287 So. 2d at 82.
48. For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the es-
sence of self-government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964), quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
49. 287 So. 2d at 83.
50. Id. at 87.
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somewhat in the nature of a rebuttable presumption against governmen-
tal restrictions of the press.51 Since the proposed statute may have the
chilling effect of discouraging publication of any political advertising52
and since there was no showing of any compelling state interest to jus-
tify this restriction,5 3 the first amendment presumption against such a
statute stood unrefuted.
IV
It is against this background that the relevance of the Red Lion
case54 can best be judged. As noted above, the Florida court relied
quite heavily on Red Lion in reaching its decision. 5  The Massachu-
setts court, on the other hand, mentioned it only once in passing
while dismissing it as dealing only with right of access to radio and
television.58
The crux of the Red Lion decision upholding the FCC's fairness
doctrine and access regulations thereunder is Justice White's statement
for the majority that
the First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others
from broadcasting on "their" frequencies and no right to an uncondi-
tional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied
others the right to use.57
The chaos that had resulted when allocation of broadcast frequencies
was left to the private sector necessitated governmental intervention to
unclutter the airwaves.58 Since the number of frequencies was limited
and since the government in the process of granting licenses to some
had to refuse them to others, it was only proper that a licensee be re-
quired
to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy
or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which
are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 59
51. This is the basis for those cases which require the showing of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest to justify infringement of first amendment rights. See, e.g., NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Schneider
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
52. 298 N.E.2d at 834-35.
53. Id.
54. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
55. See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
56. 298 N.E.2d at 832.
57. 395 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 375.
59. Id. at 389.
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From this foundation Red Lion discussed the ways the fairness doctrine
and access regulations promoted the right of the public (i.e., viewers
and listeners as well as licensees) to know and the interest of the public
in broad dissemination of information on public controversies. 60
The reason that the Florida court found the analogy to Red Lion
apt (although it sometimes struggled to do so0 1) while the Massachu-
setts court simply distinguished that case"2 is a result of their different
concepts of the first amendment. In Tornillo, the point of departure
was the first amendment values served by the access statute. These
values were espoused in Red Lion and, the situation at least being
arguably similar, it was easy to contend that the same result should
obtain. The Tornillo court argued that censorship by private interests
is as inimical to first amendment values as is government censorship;
63
thus, from its perspective, an access statute is clearly proper under, if
not compelled by, the first amendment.
In Opinion of the Justices, however, the point of departure was a
free and unfettered press, an interest which controls unless compelling
interests outweigh it. From this standpoint Red Lion is readily distin-
guishable. It is correct to say that "[n]o one has a First Amendment
right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency," 64 but with
respect to the printed media the opposite is true. Everyone has a first
amendment right to publish a newspaper. While it may be that the
trend toward concentration in the publishing industry 5 is arguably
analogous to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the crucial difference
is that in the latter case the government has the power to deny the
right to broadcast whereas it has no power to deny the right to pub-
lish.66
60. Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment goal of pro-
ducing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs to require a broad-
caster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the course of discussing
controversial issues, or to require that the political opponents of those endorsed by
the station be given a chance to communicate with the public. Otherwise, station
owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time available
only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues,
people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed.
Id. at 392.
61. At one point the court said Red Lion applied to the newspaper access statute
because "[t]he dissemination of news other than purely local is transmitted over tele-
graph wires or over air waves." 287 So. 2d at 87.
62. 298 N.E.2d at 832.
63. Id. at 84. "Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
64. 395 U.S. at 389.
65. See note 27 supra.
66. Aside from the fact-that the concentration in the publishing industry- is not gov-
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Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-
mittee17 sheds further light on the subject. In that decision the United
States Supreme Court held that neither the first amendment nor the
Federal Communications Act requires broadcast licensees to accept
paid political advertisements. 68  Under the "first amendment values"
theory this is an anomalous result, particularly since the CBS decision
in no way derogated from the position taken by the Court in Red
Lion.6 9 But it is entirely consistent with the "value judgment" theory
since there was no finding of circumstances requiring extraordinary
measures to satisfy the values presumptively promoted by a free and
unfettered press.
Although the Court did not reach the issue, it suggested that the
Congress and/or the FCC could validly fashion a right of access to
the electronic media given the peculiar nature of governmental involve-
ment in that field.70  Since CBS reaffirmed the distinction between
broadcast and print media,71 it can hardly be interpreted as authorizing
a state legislature to create a right of access to the printed media of
the type involved in these two cases.
72
ernmentally imposed, it is questionable whether that circumstance of concentration is
sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of the completely free and unfettered press.
That the concentration of the printed media threatens our nation by affording an op-
portunity to a few editors to manipulate and control the thought patterns of the Ameri-
can public is at best a dubious proposition.
The implication that the people of this country . . . are mere unthinking auto-
matons manipulated by the media, without interests, conflicts, or prejudices is an
assumption which I find quite maddening. The development of constitutional doc-
trine should not be based on such hysterical overestimation of media power and
underestimation of the good sense of the American public.
Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Ac-
cess, 85 HIARv. L. Rav. 768, 787 (1972).
67. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
68. In so doing, the Court reversed a court of appeals decision which found that
"a flat ban on paid public issue announcements is in violation of the First Amendment,
at least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted." Business Executives'
Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
69. CBS did not question the validity of the fairness doctrine, but found only that
the "forced sale of advertising" would not advance the purposes of that doctrine but
would result in a detrimental "diluting of licensee responsibility" for program content.
412 U.S. at 130-31. Moreover, Chief Justice Burger's opinion reaffirmed the clear dis-
tinction between the broadcast media and the printed press drawn by Justice White
in Red Lion. Id. at 101.
70. Id. at 131.
71. Id. at 101.
72. There is an interesting, and rather enigmatic, passage in the concurrence in
Tornillo. While concurring in the opinion and judgment of the majority, including pre-
sumably its heavy reliance on Red Lion, Justice Roberts stated: "The decision in
Columbia Broadcasting is directed solely to the peculiar and limited nature of broad-
EQUAL SPACE
The Tornillo court, however, argued that this line of reasoning ar-
rives at the absurd result that the vast power of the press is limited
by no one but the press itself.7 3  Quoting from Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida, 7 4 the court emphasized this passage: "'No institution in a democ-
racy, either governmental or private, can have absolute power. Nor can
the limits of power which enforce responsibility be finally determined by
the limited power itself.' ,75 But the quoted passage included the fol-
lowing which the court chose not to emphasize: "'But the public func-
tion which belongs to the press makes it an obligation of honor to exer-
cise this function only with the fullest sense of responsibility.' "76
This latter statement is the heart of the "value judgment" theory, i.e.,
that the press has a public responsibility which, absent extraordinary
circumstances, is best served by letting the press itself define that re-
sponsibility. Chief Justice Burger restated this view in the CBS case:
The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political,
social, and economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the ac-
ceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to as-




The Tornillo decision is somewhat ironic in that the language of the
decision contains the very rhetoric traditionally adopted by the press
in first amendment litigation. The "right of the public to know"' 8 and
the need for a "wide open and robust dissemination of ideas"79 are
catch phrases invariably found in media briefs80 and pro-press court
casting frequencies, and that decision is not applicable to the instant facts presently
before this Court in the case sub judice." 287 So. 2d at 87-88. Even more puzzling,
the justices making up the majority concurred in this concurrence! It is unstated how,
on the above rationale, Red Lion is any less distinguishable in the "case sub judice."
73. Id. at 82-83.
74. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
75. 287 So. 2d at 82 (emphasis in original), qu6ling 328 U.S. at 355 (Frankfurter,
I., concurring).
76. 287 So. 2d at 82, quoting 328 U.S. at 365.
77. 412 U.S. at 117.
78. 287 So. 2d at 82.
79. Id. at 86.
80. See, e.g., Brief for The New York Times Co., et al. as Amici Curiae, United
States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972): "If ...there is a firstness also among
the interests fostered by the (First Amendment), then it is the interest in the flow of
politically relevant information to the public." Brief for Amici Curiae at 13-14.
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opinions."' The appellant in Tornillo made much of this apparent in-
consistency in the press' position. In Branzburg v. Hayes,82 he argued,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment does
not exempt newsmen from responding to grand jury subpoenas, 8  nor
does it create a testimonial privilege which allows newsmen to conceal
confidential sources of information where that information is relevant
to the investigations of the grand jury. 4  The newsmen had argued
that unless such a privilege was recognized the fear of disclosure would
cause their sources of information to dry up, "all to the detriment of the
free flow of information protected by -the First Amendment." 5 The
Court rejected the newsmen's argument, holding that the first amend-
ment did not compel such a privilege; s6 however, it recognized that
the Congress or the state legislatures could create this privilege by legis-
lative action.8 7 Tornillo contended that this rationale was directly ap-
plicable to the access statute:
If the Legislatures of this country can be called upon to enact a privi-
lege for the press to aid it in carrying out its responsibility to inform
the public, cannot the same Legislature shape, nurture, and define the
responsibility itself?88
He urged that the very arguments raised by the press on its behalf in
Branzburg apply with equal force to support the constitutionality of
the Florida access statute.8 9
How, in the name of morality, can a newspaper demand a privilege
from the courts and Legislatures of this country, for the sake of advanc-
ing the public's knowledge, but resist as it is doing here, a legislatively
defined responsibility to add to the knowledge of the same public dur-
ing an election campaign?90
81. See, e.g., Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972):
The reporter's constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source
stems from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to
the public. It is this basic concern that underlies the Constitution's protection of
a free press . . . because the guarantee is "not for the benefit of the press so much
as for the benefit of all of us."
Id. at 725-26 (citations omitted).
82. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
83. Id. at 690-91.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 680.
86. Id. at 690-91.
87. Id. at 706.
88. Brief for Appellant at v-vi.
89. Id. at v.
90. Id. at vii. The appellant continued: "Perhaps we should not question the press
in the name of morality. The press has always demanded privileges; the press has always
resisted its responsibilities," Id,
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The superficial attractiveness of this analysis cannot survive close
scrutiny. The "value judgment" theory recognizes that first amend-
ment values are the raison d'6tre of the constitutional provision.9 1
But the Framers expressed these values in terms of the "freedom of
the press," thereby expressing a judgment that a free press should have
a preferred position92 in satisfying those values. Thus, as in Branz-
burg, when the press employs the rhetoric of first amendment values,
it does so, not to justify the privilege in and of itself, but to demonstrate
that such a privilege is comprehended within the scope of the concept
"freedom of the press" upon which the value judgment operates.
The command of the first amendment is that Congress shall not
abridge the freedom of the press. The enactment by Congress of legis-
lation which furthers the value judgment expressed by the first amend-
ment (such as the statutory creation of a testimonial privilege for news-
men93) is clearly a proper exercise of its granted powers. Congress
could not, however,.enact legislation requiring that newsmen respond
to subpoenas in all events, under all circumstances, availing themselves
only of those defenses against appearance available to all private indi-
viduals.9 4 This would be unconstitutional, not because it offended first
amendment values, but because it restricted the free press which is the
constitutional expression of those values. Similarly, the Florida access
statute, while it may support first amendment values, should fail be-
cause it impinges directly and substantially on the constitutionally ap-
proved method for furthering those values, i.e., a free press.
VI
Justice Stewart made an interesting, and perhaps prophetic, observa-
tion in his Pittsburgh Press dissent:
So far as I know, this is the first case in this or any other American
court that permits a government agency to enter a composing room of
a newspaper and dictate to the publisher the layout and makeup of
91. See part m supra.
92. 408 U.S. at 721 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
94. This is implicit in the Branzburg holding. While the public interest in effective
grand jury proceedings may have been compelling enough to outweigh the newsmen's
interests in the situations presented to the Court, a blanket requirement for newsman
appearances would be improper. See especially Powell, J., concurring:
[W]e do not hold . . . that state and federal authorities are free to "annex" the
news media as "an investigative arm of government." . . . [N]o harassment of
newsmen will be tolerated .... [Tihe courts will be available to newsmen under
circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.
408 U.S. at 709-10.
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the newspaper's pages. This is the first such case, but I fear it may
not be -the last. . . . So long as Members of this Court view the First
Amendment as no more than a set of "values" to be balanced against
other "values," that Amendment will remain in grave jeopardy.99
It has been proposed that the first amendment be amended to reflect
expressly the "first amendment values" theory.90 But such an approach
would countenance almost limitless government intervention in the
name of "first amendment values" in clear violation of the "thou shalt
not" philosophy of the first amendment as originally and wisely consti-
tuted. The consequences of such governmental intrusion on the free-
dom of the press drew comment in CBS:
Freedom of the press would -then be gone. In its place we would
have such governmental controls upon the press as a majority of this
Court at any particular moment might consider First Amendment "val-
ues" to require. It is a frightening specter.97
Steven Y. Dzida
95. 413 U.S. at 402.
96. Barron, supra note 5, at 1675-76, quotes a proposal by Meiklejohn to add this
language to the first amendment:
"In view of the intellectual and cultural responsibilities laid upon the citizens of a
free society by the political institutions of self-government, the Congress, acting in
cooperation with the several states and with nongovernmental organizations serv-
ing the same general purpose, shall have power to provide for the intellectual and
cultural education of all of the citizens of the United States,"
P7, 412 U.S. at 133 (Stewart, J., concurring),
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